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FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL FISCAL
ARRANGEMENTS:
THEIR IMPACT ON SOCIAL POLICY AND
CURRENT PROSPECTS FOR REFORM
Harry Beatty *
I. FEDERAL -PROVINCIAL FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS
AND CANADIAN SOCIAL POLICY
For the student of Canadian social policy, the most arcane yet essential
subject is provided by the federal-provincial fiscal arrangements which
impact so pervasively. These agreements play a crucial, if somewhat
hidden, role in determining the shape of income maintenance programs
and social services. The purpose of this paper is to provide an introduc-
tion to such agreements, especially the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP),'
to explain, making use of examples, how agreements such as CAP deter-
mine and sometimes limit income maintenance and social service pro-
grams delivered by the provinces, and to explore current prospects for
reform. The present-day events and possibilities which may change
these fiscal arrangements (and not necessarily for the better as far as dis-
advantaged individuals and groups are concerned) are: the Federal-
Provincial Review of Fiscal Arrangements Affecting Persons with
Disabilities (the "Review"); administrative and Charter litigation;
and constitutional reform (the "Meech Lake / Langevin Block agree-
ment"). Each of these will be discussed in turn, once the main features of
CAP have been considered, and related fiscal arrangements outlined
briefly.
Fiscal arrangements in the social policy field are a product of the
Canadian system of federalism. At the time of Confederation, matters
such as social welfare, health and education were regarded as local
responsibilities not requiring major governmental involvement or expen-
* Copyright © 1987 Harry Beatty. Harry Beatty is a lawyer with the Advocacy
Resource Centre for the Handicapped (ARCH) in Toronto, Ontario.
1 Canada Assistance Plan, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-1.
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ditures. Accordingly, the British North America Act placed these
within provincial jurisdiction. The federal government was assigned
what were then the more important and costly functions of government -
defence and national security, the administration of justice, major public
works. To pay for these responsibilities, the primary taxing powers were
given to the national government.
During the 1930's, the severe hardship experienced by many Canadians
led to political initiatives aimed at increasing the federal role in social
programs. While many of these initiatives did not succeed at first, they
created a climate of expectations which ultimately resulted in signifi-
cant developments during the post-war period. Constitutional amend-
ment and interpretation permitted direct federal delivery of important
income support programs - unemployment insurance, family allowances,
old age security and the Canada Pension Plan. In the wide fields of
social assistance, human services, and health and education, on the
other hand, the federal role was limited constitutionally to indirect
participation through contributing to the cost of provincial programs.
There evolved a series of fiscal arrangements whereby the federal gov-
ernment uses its greater monetary resources to pay in part for programs
entirely within provincial jurisdiction. These arrangements, especially
CAP, played an essential role in the national development of income
maintenance and social service programs.
In considering federal-provincial fiscal arrangments certain general fac-
tors must be kept in mind:
(a) the contributions made by the federal and provincial govern-
ments respectively, and whether these are adequate to fund
the program;
(b) the equity or inequity among provinces, having regard for
the regional economic disparities which exist in Canada;
(c) the conditions or criteria placed by the federal government
on its contributions;
(d) the open-endedness or closed-endedness of the contribu-
tions - whether there is a fixed limit to the federal contribu-
tions; and
(e) the flexibility of the arrangements - whether it is easy or
difficult to make changes so that a federal contribution will
be available for new or expanded programs.
These factors provide key indicators of how federal-provincial fiscal
arrangements impact on social policy. We shall return to them in the
consideration of specific arrangements which follows.
2
2 There have been several excellent recent studies of federal-provincial fiscal
arrangements in the social policy field. The interested reader is referred to:
(1988), 3 Journal of Law and Social Policy
II. THE CANADA ASSISTANCE PLAN: PRINCIPLES
AND LIMITATIONS
OVERVIEW
CAP is a federal statute enacted by Parliament in 1966 after consultation
with the provinces. As stated in the preamble, its objectives are "the
provision of adequate assistance to and in respect of persons in need" and
"removal of the causes of poverty and dependence on public assistance".
These objectives are to be attained through a fuller sharing by the fed-
eral overnment in the costs of social programs than had existed prior to
1966. The basic formula is 50/50 cost-sharing between the two levels of
Keith G. Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism (Kingston and
Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press and the Institute of
Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, 1982); Jacqueline S. Ismael,
ed., Canadian Social Welfare Policy: Federal and Provincial Dimensions
(Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press and the Institute of
Public Administration of Canada, 1985), especially the contributions by Leslie A.
Pal, Derek P.J. Hum and H. Phillip Hepworth; Richard J. Van Loon and Michael
S. Whittington, The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure and
Process, 3d ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1981), Chap. 9; Allan M.
Maslove and Bohodar Rubashewsky, "Cooperation and Confrontation: The
Challenges of Fiscal Federalism", in How Ottawa Spends 1986-87: Tracking the
Tories, ed. Michael J. Prince (Toronto: Methuen, 1986); David M. Cameron and
J. Stefan Duprd, "The Financial Framework of Income Distribution and Social
Services", in Canada and the New Constitution: The Unfinished Agenda, ed.
Stanley M. Beck and Ivan Bernier (Montreal: The Institute for Research in
Public Policy, 1983), Vol. 1, pp. 333-339; Mark Krasnick, ed., Fiscal Federalism
(Volume 65 in the series of studies commissioned as part of the research pro-
gram of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development
Prospects for Canada) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), especially
the contributions by Robin Boadway and Claude E. Forget; and Fiscal
Federalism in Canada (Report of the Parliamentary Task Force on Federal-
Provincial Fiscal Arrangements: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1981),
especially Chap. IV and VI.
3 Despite its importance, the number of studies of CAP available are limited.
The sources in footnote 2 above are helpful. The only full-length monograph on
CAP is: Derek P.J. Hum, Federalism and the Poor: A Review of the Canada
Assistance Plan (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1983). Other accounts
have been developed by government or for government-sponsored reviews.
There is the study of CAP by the "Nielsen Task Force": Canada Assistance Plan:
A Study Team Report to the Task Force on Program Review (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services Canada, 1986). A brief overview was prepared for Ontario's
Social Assistance Review by Des Byrne as a discussion paper simply entitled
"Canada Assistance Plan". The author has also used the briefing notes on CAP
and VRDP prepared for provincial organizations by Government of Ontario offi-
cials involved in the Federal-Provincial Review of Fiscal Arrangements Affecting
Persons with Disabilities.
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government for "assistance" and "welfare services" as these are defined
within the Act. "Assistance" may be understood generally as income
maintenance or social assistance, while "welfare services" are social or
human services. Their precise definitions will be considered below. 4
CAP does not directly establish either assistance programs or welfare
services. Nor does it require the provinces to establish them. Rather, it
is enabling legislation permitting the federal government to enter into
cost-sharing agreements with the provinces. All of the provinces have
entered into Part I CAP agreements and receive 50% federal cost-sharing
for thegreat majority of their income maintenance and social service pro-
grams. To be eligible for cost-sharing, these programs must meet certain
conditions (to be discussed shortly). While CAP does not directly require
the provinces to establish assistance and welfare programs complying
with these conditions, obviously the availability of a 50% federal con-
tribution is a factor to be weighed heavily by the provinces in consider-
ing program design.
The wording of CAP is very general statutory language. Since 1966, there
has been only one amendment (in 1972) and that was relatively minor.
The CAP regulations are also quite general and definitional, and they
too have been amended infrequently. Essentially the same "standard
form" cost-sharing agreement has been used with all of the provinces
since 1966. These are basic documents which define the broad parame-
ters of cost-sharing but do not provide detailed rules.
More specificity comes from additional government documents:
(a) The standard form CAP agreement has three schedules
which are particularized to each province and which are
revised from time to time. Schedule "A" lists "Homes for
Special Care", schedule "B" lists "Provincially Approved
Agencies" and schedule "C" lists "Provincial Law" recognized
4 CAP is actually divided into three parts. Part I covers assistance and welfare
services: this is the major part of the statute to which our attention is restricted
in this paper. Part II deals with "Indian Welfare" but in fact has not been used to
provide cost-sharing to the provinces for this purpose. Part III relates to "Work
Activity Projects" and agreements in this area do exist with all provinces: how-
ever, the payments under Part III are less than 1% of the payments under Part I.
See Byrne, Canada Assistance Plan discussion paper, supra, note 3 at 2.
s Quebec has a slightly different payment mechanism (involving a partial sub-
stitution of tax transfers for cash payments) but for all practical purposes has the
same arrangements as other provinces. In discussions with federal and provin-
cial officials, the author discovered a difference of opinion as to whether Quebec
is "in CAP" but the issue appears to be one of semantics.
6 This account is based on Byrne, "Canada Assistance Plan" discussion paper,
supra, note 3 at 7.
(1988), 3 Journal of Law and Social Policy
for cost-sharing purposes. (These terms are all defined under
CAP).
(b) There have been guidelines issued from time to time under
the authority of the Minister of National Health and
Welfare (under whose Ministry the Canada Assistance Plan
Directorate comes). The guidelines on assistance are: Earnings
Exemption Guideline (1982/85); Liquid Asset Exemption
Guideline (1980); Special Flat Rate Allowance for the Aged
and Disabled Guideline (1984); and Guideline Concerning
Supplementation of Low Income Earnings (1980). The guide-
lines on welfare services are: Guidelines on Likelihood of
Need Under the Welfare Services Provisions (1983);
Guidelines on Community Development Services; and
Guidelines on Eligibility for Welfare Services Provided by a
Child Welfare Authority. The latter two guidelines are
found in a more comprehensive document entitled "Notes on
Welfare Services under the Canada Assistance Plan" (1985)
which gives cost-sharing requirements in more detail. There
is a guideline on work activity projects (with which we are
not directly concerned in this paper). Finally there is the for-
midably-titled "Guidelines on Cost-Sharing under the
Canada Assistance Plan as modified by the Extended Health
Care Services Program under EPF, 1977-84" (1985). (EPF is
explained briefly in the next section of this paper.)
(c) Various policy positions and legal interpretations relating
to CAP have been developed internal to government. These
may be communicated in letters from the Minister of National
Health and Welfare or Ministry officials to provincial
governments.
The administrative manner in which CAP has been developed has
important consequences. The programs cost-shared under CAP have
evolved and changed over the past two decades. Yet it has not been
necessary to amend the statute, regulations or standard-form agreement
on a regular basis to accommodate these changes. This shows that CAP
is flexible (to a degree) -it creates a system which can be adapted at
the bureaucratic level to new developments without waiting for law
reform. On the other hand, the system created has been made somewhat
immune from the political process, and this may well have worked to
the disadvantage of groups wanting to advocate in the social policy
field. Changes in legislation provide important opportunities for public
advocacy, so a very general statute like CAP which governments can
leave unamended (while making substantive changes through notes,
guidelines and policy statements ) is a barrier to public participation in
the development of policy.
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CAP cost-sharing has tended to become an esoteric specialization really
understood only by "insiders"-the federal and provincial officials
involved in day-to-day administration and negotiation. While interest
by advocates in CAP and related cost-sharing arrangements has become
greater (in large part due to the prospects for reform discussed later in
this paper), their knowledge base still tends to be quite limited. Part of
the reason for this has been the restricted distribution of key documents.
While the Act itself, the regulations and the Annual Reports have
always been widely available, more detailed and informative docu-
ments such as the agreement, the schedules, guidelines, notes, policy
statements and legal interpretations have not been circulated as much.
These documents must be reviewed by anyone seeking to understand CAP.
The standard form agreement, together with all of the guidelines and
notes referred to above are available (in a packaie with the statute and
regulations) from Health and Welfare Canada. In discussions with
federal and provincial officials, the author has formed the general
impression that the schedules to CAP agreements would be available
from provincial governments, while internal policy positions and legal
interpretations would not be, but he has not had the opportunity to
research this in detail (nor to consider the possible implications of free-
dom of information legislation). The view of the officials consulted was
that the complexity and extent of the information involved, rather than
policies of confidentiality, constitute the major barrier to better public
understanding of CAP.
The importance of CAP may be indicated by a few figures. As of fiscal
1984-85, CAP contributions by the federal government totalled about $4
billion.' As total federal expenditures for that year were approxi-
mately $109 billion,9 CAP represents slightly less than 4% of the total
federal budget. The breakdown of CAP expenditures was:
7 Write to: Canada Assistance Plan Directorate
Social Service Program Branch





s Canada Assistance Plan Annual Report 1984-85, Table 1, p. 13.
9 Michael J. Prince, "The Mulroney Agenda: A Right Turn for Ottawa?" in How
Ottawa Spends 1986-87: Tracking the Tories, ed. Prince, Table 1.7, pp. 52-53.
42 (1988), 3 Journal of Law and Social Policy
General Assistance 69.0%
(Income Maintenance / Social Assistance)
Welfare Services 14.9%
Homes for Special Care 9.9%
Child Welfare 3.4%
Health Care 2.8%
Work Activity Projects .1%
Thus assistance (meaning primarily income maintenance or social assis-
tance) is the major category under CAP," which we now examine in more
detail.
CONDITIONS FOR ASSISTANCE
The following conditions for assistance are set by the CAP statute:
(a) the support provided must fall within one of the catego-
ries listed in the definition of "assistance" (Section 2);
(b) the province must provide assistance to any "person in
need" as defined (Section 6(2)(a); definition of "person in
need" in Section 2);
(c) the province must take into account a person's budgetary
requirements and the income and resources available to the
person to meet them in determining eligibility and level of
payments - that is, the province must use a needs test (Section
6(2)(b));
(d) the province may not require a period of residency in the
province as a condition of eligibility (Section 6(2)(d));
(e) the province must establish an appeals system with
respect to assistance (Section 6(2)(e));
(f) assistance must be provided pursuant to "provincial law"
(Section 4; "provincial law" defined in Section 2);
(g) assistance must be provided '"by or at the request of pro-
vincially approved agencies", where "provincially approved
agencies" include branches of government as well as non-profit
organizations - note, however, that the phrase "at the
request of' opens the door to the provision of assistance to be
1o Canada Assistance Plan Annual Report 1984-85, Table 3, p. 15.
11 Technically "assistance" under CAP includes care in homes for special care,
certain health care expenditures, and the majority of child welfare expenditures,
but income maintenance or social assistance is the largest component and what
we shall focus on.
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used to purchase services from for-profit agencies, although
for-profits themselves cannot be "provincially approved"
under CAP (Section 4(a); "provincially approved agency"
defined in Section 2); and
(h) the province must provide records and accounts to the
federal government (Section 6(2)(f)).
Aside from technical and administrative matters, these provisions set
out the criteria for CAP cost-sharing of provincial assistance programs.
Of the requirements just listed, the needs test (c) has had the greatest
impact on assistance programs in the provinces and we shall concentrate
on it.12 The key definition is that cost-shared assistance is limited to a"person in need" as defined (Section 2):
"a person who, by reason of inability to obtain employment,
loss of the principal family provider, illness, disability, age
or other cause of any kind acceptable to the provincial author-
ity, is found to be unable (on the basis of a test that takes into
account that person's budgetary requirements and the income
and resources available to him to meet such requirements) to
provide adequately for himself, and for himself and his
dependants or any of them."13
The needs test has three components:
i) an asset test;
ii) rules for the budgetary assessment of the applicant's
requirements; and
(iii) rules for determining deductions with respect to availa-
ble income.
If the applicant qualifies under (i), the social assistance payable is the
result of (ii) less the result of (iii), with certain qualifications.14
12 The definition of "assistance" is quite general and has not limited signifi-
cantly what the provinces can do. The appeals system requirement has not been
further detailed under CAP and the federal government has not played an active
role in the development of provincial appeals systems. Similarly, the other
requirements have not had the impact on provincial policies that the needs test
has had.
13 A second part of the definition (left out here) includes children in the child
welfare system.
14 See Byrne, "Canada Assistance Plan" discussion paper, supra, note 3 at 5.
(1988), 3 Journal of Law and Social Policy
ASSETTEST
The first component, the asset test, may be used to illustrate how CAP
works. The statutory provision cited above requires only in very general
language that the provincial test "takes into account .... resources
available". But the Minister of National Health and Welfare has
issued a Liquid Asset Exemption Guideline (1980) which much more spe-
cifically sets out the following rules:
'The Canada Assistance Plan will recognize, for cost-sharing
purposes, provincial asset exemption regulations that,
1. exempt up to $2,500 for a single person and $3,000 when
that person is aged or disabled.
2. exempt up to $5,000 for a person with one dependent (a
couple and/or a single parent with one child) and $5,500 when
the applicant and/or spouse is aged or disabled.
3. exempt, where there is more than one dependent, an addi-
tional $500 for the second and each additional dependent.
4. exempt an additional amount (no dollar limit) where the
amount is or has been placed in a special fund or trust arrange-
ment for purposes which the province deems to be socially
important (e.g. equipment to overcome disabilities, future
maintenance of education of a child who is declared depen-
dent at the time of application).
5. accord discretionary authority to senior provincial officials
to waive asset exemption regulations for applicants who have
extraordinary circumstances.
6. permit the province to apply the above exemptions, unless
otherwise specified in "provincial law", to all segments of its
social assistance caseload."
These rules are in no way implied by the statute or regulations. They are
simply Ministerial guidelines which are developed, it may be assumed,
in consultation with the provinces.
If a province exceeds these guidelines, cost-sharing is lost. For example,
a province which supplements the federal Guaranteed Income
Supplement (GIS) to seniors without using an asset test must do so with
100% provincial funds. (GIS itself is income-tested, but not asset-tested,
so it is not needs-tested.) The province would have to asset-test in accor-
dance with the guideline quoted above to get CAP cost-sharing for this
program. Another example would be a province using higher asset levels
in its social assistance program than those indicated in the guideline.
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CAP cost-sharing would be lost (at least with respect to those on the
caseload who would not meet the more restrictive guideline levels).'5
Provinces may, of course, implement such programs but they have to do so
with "100% provincial dollars" rather than with "50% dollars". As
noted above, this is a significant disincentive.
An income maintenance program which sets permissible asset levels as
low as the CAP guideline requires has a significant negative impact on
applicants and recipients. The senior citizen with modest savings, the
single parent with a divorce settlement, and the disabled person with a
bequest from a parent's estate are all placed in the same unfortunate
position. Their modest funds must be spent down to the liquid asset
exemption level before any assistance will be provided. If the funds
could be preserved, they could be used to meet special needs, to provide
future security and an on-going source of income (which in turn might
reduce the need for government support on a long-term rather than short-
term basis). The policy reflected in the CAP guideline, on the other
hand, encourages depletion of the fund over a short period so that the
client can receive social assistance again. 6 Low asset levels serve to
keep disadvantaged people in poverty-to take away the resources
which may give them a margin of safety or which may provide opportu-
nities to support independence. This outcome is contrary to the stated
objectives of CAP but it is the result of the liquid asset exemption guide-
line nevertheless.
The liquid asset exemption guideline in effect as of the time of writing
this paper (August, 1987) was issued in July, 1980. The permitted asset
levels have not been increased since them. And prior to the 1980 guide-
line, the levels had remained at the same level for a decade (at about
half the 1980 levels). This indicates clearly how the CAP system has
failed to keep pace with changing economic and social conditions. The
failure to change the liquid asset rules appropriately is a joint responsi-
bility of the federal and provincial governments. While the Minister of
National Health and Welfare has not improved the guideline, it is rea-
sonable to infer that little provincial pressure has been brought to do so.
's It is clear in the guideline that provinces are free to establish lower liquid
asset levels if they wish.
16 It might appear that there is room within the guideline to be more flexible in
the treatment of liquid assets, in that a "special fund or trust arrangement" can
be exempted (paragraph 4) and in that discretion can be given to waive asset
rules in "extraordinary circumstances" (paragraph 5). However, the provinces
have not used the "special fund or trust arrangement" provision (perhaps
because of the technical and administrative complexities it would raise). And a
discretion, reserved to "senior provincial officials" to be exercised on a case-by-
case basis is not an effective solution in a system like social assistance which has
a very large caseload.
(1988), 3 Journal of Law and Social Policy
Other CAP rules as well have negative consequences for provincial social
assistance programs. The earnings exemption guideline (1982) is too
restrictive to provide appropriate supports and incentives to social assis-
tance recipients returning to the work force, and inhibits provincial pro-
grams to support the working poor. The CAP agreement with the
provinces requires that income from federal programs such as unemploy-
ment insurance (UIC) or the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) come dollar-for-
dollar off social assistance.'" So, for example, federal improvements in
CPP do not benefit at all many provincial income maintenance recipients
who derive part of their support from CPP. The province must take 100%
of any CPP increase off their social assistance cheques or lose CAP cost-
sharing. 19
In the field of social assistance, then, under CAP needs-testing rules
have been developed which effectively limit the income maintenance
policies of provincial governments in important respects. (Not, however,
with respect to rates - the provinces are free to set rates of assistance at
any level without losing cost-sharing.) If provinces wish to establish
asset or income tests which will be fairer to clients, which will help
them to escape poverty, which will help them to benefit from other
resources which may be available, they must do so with "100% dollars"
rather than "50% dollars", a very significant disincentive given the cost
and magnitude of income maintenance programs.
WELFARE SERVICES
As discussed above, Part I of CAP provides for cost-sharing agreements to
cover welfare services as well as assistance. "Welfare services" under
CAP cover social and human services. The conditions for cost-sharing of
welfare services are:
(a) the services must fit within the following definition
(Section 2):
".... services having as their object the lessening, removal
17 Hum, Federalism and the Poor: A Review of the Canada Assistance Plan,
supra, note 3, Chap. 5, pp. 54-68.
1I Paragraph 2 (b) (iii).
19 In January, 1987, CPP disability benefits were increased, but many disabled
persons receiving both CPP and social assistance wound up with no effective
gain at all because of this rule. The Minister of National Health and Welfare,
the Honourable Jake Epp, offered to amend the CAP agreement to avoid this
result but the majority of provinces refused on the grounds that it was unfair to
treat those receiving CPP more favourably than other social assistance
recipients.
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or prevention of the causes and effects of poverty, child
neglect or dependence on public assistance, and, without limit-
ing the generality of the foregoing, includes
(a) rehabilitation services,
(b) casework, counselling, assessment and referral services,
(c) adoption services,
(d) homemaker, day-care and similar services,
(e) community development services,
(f) consulting, research and evaluation services with respect
to welfare programs, and
(g) administrative, secretarial and clerical services, includ-
ing staff training, relating to the provision of any of the fore-
going services or to the provision of assistance,
but does not include any service relating wholly or mainly to
education, correction or any other matter prescribed by
regulation or, except for the purposes of the definition
"assistance", any service provided by way of assistance;
(b) the province "will continue, as may be necessary and expe-
dient, the development and extension of welfare services"
(Section 6 (2)(c));
(c) cost-sharing is limited to welfare services provided "to or
in respect of persons in need or persons who are likely to
become persons in need unless such services are provided" -
that is, the province must use a "likelihood of need test"
(Section 2: definition of "welfare services in the province");
(d) welfare services must be provided pursuant to "provincial
law" (Section 4: "provincial law" defined in Section 2);
(e) welfare services must be provided "by provincially
approved agencies" - these include branches of government as
well as non-profits - note that, unlike assistance, for welfare
services the additional phrase "by or at the request of' is not
used, so for-profit agencies cannot be directly funded to pro-
vide welfare services (Section 4 (b); "provincially approved
agency" defined in Section 2); and
(f) the province must provide records and accounts to the fed-
eral government (Section 6 (2) (f)).
There are additional technical and administrative requirements.
(1988), 3 Journal of Law and Social Policy
As with assistance, the CAP welfare services rules have important
implications for social services such as day care, homemaker services
and counselling developed by the provinces. The "likelihood of need"
basis for cost-sharing has been interpreted by guideline narrowly on the
basis of income levels, and this has required provinces to inquire into the
incomes of clients receiving services (at least on a statistical basis)."
While likelihood of need is more flexible as a criterion than a needs
test, it still provides disincentives to provinces to provide services to
deserving individuals and families whose incomes are above the guide-
line levels. For example, persons with severe disabilities and corre-
spondingly substantial needs may not qualify if they have moderate
incomes (or if their families do in the case of children). Provinces which
provide or fund services to them must do so with 100% dollars (unless
they are in a class qualifying through proxy indicators or sampling).
Alternatively, the province may charge user fees to reduce its own contri-
bution. In fact, the CAP guideline assumes as a primary model a two-
stage system of user fees, with a 50% "tax-back" (user fee) past an initial
turning point and a 100% "tax-back" at a higher level.21 So there is an
incentive to impose user fees for services on those of modest means even if
their special circumstances may entail extraordinary costs.
The "likelihood of need" test also creates obstacles through the percep-
tion it creates of social services on the part of providers as well as cli-
ents. Income-testing has a stigmatizing effect which may lead those
who should benefit from the services to forego seeking them out alto-
gether.' Where services are provided, income-testing makes clients
seem to be recipients of charity with service providers as their benefac-
tors. This view is reinforced by the limitations as to the kinds of services
cost-sharable as welfare services. An examination of the definition of"welfare services" cited above shows a strong emphasis on casework and
direct support. While these are essential, other components of what
Hum calls a "social investment strategy" are left out, as he notes.23
These include:
20The CAP "Guidelines on Likelihood of Need under the Welfare Services
Provisions" (1983) set out eligibility requirements which can be satisfied by: (i)
individual income testing of clients to compare their incomes with levels esta-
blished by a formula; (ii) the use of proxy indicators such as whether seniors
receive GIS; or (iii) statistical sampling of clients as to income. All three
approaches obviously require provinces to inquire (or to require agencies to
inquire) into the income levels of clients of social services.
21 Ibid. at 2-6.
22 Hum, Federalism and the Poor: A Review of the Canada Assistance Plan,
supra, note 3 at 70.
23 Hum, supra, note 3 at 72.
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" skills training (the definition of "welfare services"
excludes "education")
* job creation (see "Notes on Welfare Services" (1985), p. 9)
" public information programs ("Notes on Welfare Services"
(1985), p.9)
" volunteer service bureaus ("Notes on Welfare Services"
(1985), p. 9)
" advocacy organizations (not providing direct client
services)
" funding organizations such as United Way (not providing
direct client services).
While these may have public funding from other sources, they do not
have the established base which CAP cost-sharing would provide.
It might appear that the heading "community development services"
under the "welfare services" definition might open the door to cost-
sharing for more innovative services, such as public education and advo-
cacy. But the "Guidelines on Community Development Services" (1985)
take away much of this potential through restrictive rules.24 We again
have a situation where the guidelines remove what the legislation
might be interpreted to provide.
NEED FOR REFORM
The CAP rules for both assistance and welfare services, then, while pro-
gressive in 1966, now require fundamental reform. There are limitations
in the legislative framework but, more importantly, additional restric-
tions in guidelines, notes, policies and so on. Public understanding and
participation in CAP has been limited by its complexity and by its
development through federal-provincial administration and negotiation
largely removed from the political process. After describing related
cost-sharing legislation briefly in the next section, we return to these
CAP-related themes in discussing prospects for reform.
III. RELATED FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE
SOCIAL POLICY FIELD
Besides CAP three other important federal statutes provide for social
policy program contributions to the provinces. These are: the
24 "Guidelines on Community Development Services" in "Notes on Welfare
Services under the Canada Assistance Plan" (1985).
(1988), 3 Journal of Law and Social Policy
Established Programs Financing Act (EPF),25 the Canada Health Act
(CHA), 26 and the Vocational Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons Act
(VRDP).
27
ESTABLISHED PROGRAMS FINANCING ACT (EPF)
During the post-war period, but especially during the late 1950's and
1960's, the federal government developed major cost-sharing arrange-
ments with the provinces in the areas of hospital insurance, medicare
and extended health-care services, and post-secondary education.28 By
the 1970's concerns emerged at both levels of government about these
arrangements. The federal government wanted to control inflation and
was concerned about the rising costs of these programs. The provincial
governments, while in need of the funding (especially in the poorer prov-
inces), objected to the conditions imposed by the arrangements and
wanted to determine their own programs without the constraints
imposed by cost-sharing rules.
The result of federal-provincial discussions about these varying objec-
tives was EPF in 1977. Cost-sharing was replaced under EPF in these
broad areas by a two-part fiscal arrangement. One part was a cash
transfer determined by expenditures in a base year (1975-76) and increas-
ing in accordance with provincial population and growth in GNP, as
determined by complex formulas. The other part was a reduction in fed-
eral tax rates permitting an increase in provincial rates (a transfer of
"tax points"). The conditions imposed on the provincial government to
receive the funding under EPF were very general and limited.'
EPF arrangements have remained contentious between the levels of gov-
ernment. Both the federal and provincial levels have accused the other
of making inadequate contributions. The federal government has moved
to further restrict EPF contributions, while some provinces have reduced
25 This is the short title. The full title is: Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements
and Post-Secondary Education and Health Contributions Act, 1977,
S.C. 1984, c. 6.
26 Canada Health Act, S.C. 1984, c. 6.
27 Vocational Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. V-7.
28 The sources in footnote 2 document this development. Fiscal Federalism in
Canada is an excellent source of information in particular.
29 Following the EPF arrangements in 1977, conditions such as universality of
coverage, comprehensiveness of insured services, accessibility, portability and
public administration remained legally in effect in the health care field, but no
effective mechanisms were available to deal with erosion of these standards.
See Fiscal Federalism in Canada, pp. 105-112.
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their contributions to health and post-secondary education (especially
the latter). The stakes are high in this area: the estimated federal
contribution for fiscal 1985-86 is $14.7 billion30 which is about 15% of the
total federal budget.
EPF has inter-relationships with social assistance and social services
funding under CAP in that there are persons, particularly in institutional
settings, who receive support from both.31 But EPF illustrates as well an
alternative way that CAP could work - on an unconditional grant of
"block funding" basis with payments determined by a formula rather
than by the application of specific criteria to clients and services. The
advantage of this approach would be to vest responsibility and account-
ability for social policy programs at one level of government-the pro-
vincial level-which might permit reform and innovation in a manner
now hampered by the divided jurisdiction under CAP. It is argued as
well that provincial circumstances differ and that the provincial social
services ministries can be more responsive as they are closer to disadvan-
taged individuals and groups.
But the risks of "block funding" are very significant, too. It has the
potential for being a vehicle to implement fiscal restraint at both levels.
The federal government under CAP is committed to cost-share with
respect to all qualifying income maintenance recipients and social service
programs. That is, CAP is open-ended-there is no fixed caseload or
spending limit. This is especially important with respect to income
maintenance. In difficult economic periods, many people exhaust their
UIC benefits and move to social assistance, which is automatically 50%
cost-shared. Under a block funding scheme, support by the federal gov-
ernment for social assistance would be closed-ended, and the increased
support from the federal level would not be automatic. On the other
hand, the provincial governments under CAP have a built-in incentive to
spend on social programs (using "50% dollars") which would disappear
under block funding, allowing them to restrain social spending as well.
The EPF history gives reason for concern at both the federal and provin-
cial levels about block funding, a concern which is shared by social pol-
icy advocates.32
30 Maslove and Rubashewsky, "Cooperation and Confrontation: The Challenges
of Fiscal Federalism", supra note 2 at 104.
31 This is explained in "Guidelines on Cost-Sharing under the Canada Assistance
Plan as modified by the Extended Health Care Services Program under EPF,
1977- 84" (1985).
32 In 1978, the federal government introduced Bill C-55, the Social Services
Financing Act, which would have brought block funding to the social services
area. Both provincial governments (especially in the "have-not" provinces) and
advocacy organizations objected that it would reduce the federal contribution.
On closer analysis, however, it appeared that federal payments would be
increased, and the federal government withdrew the bill. Several of the sources
in footnote 2 discuss Bill C-55 as part of the history of federal-provincial relations
in this area.
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CANADA HEALTH ACT (CHA)
During the late 1970's and early 1980's the federal government became
concerned about its lack of control over provincial expenditures and pro-
gram direction under EPF. This was especially true with respect to
health care and the particular problem of extra-billing. In order to rem-
edy the problem of inequities in the health care system which extra-
billing created (and perhaps to increase its visibility with the public in
the health care field as well) the federal government introduced the
Canada Health Act. This legislation was introduced unilaterally with
several provinces objecting (although the CHA had the support of all
three parties at the federal level).
Section 18-21 of the CHA set up a system whereby the federal EPF cash
grant is reduced to a province by the amount of extra-billing fees and user
charges collected. This penalty clause has proved effective in getting
the provinces to ban extra-billing by doctors, often after a bitter political
fight that the provincial governments otherwise might well not have
undertaken. While the objective of eliminating extra-billing and user
fees has been substantially advanced by the CHA, there has, however,
been left a legacy of concern on the part of the provinces that the federal
government would use its spending power in this way to influence provin-
cial decision-making in an area of provincial jurisdiction.
The CHA also sets out other, less controversial, program criteria which
provinces must meet in order to get a full EPF cash contribution:
(a) public administration -the health care insurance plan
must be administered by a public authority responsible to the
provincial government on a non-profit basis (Section 8);
(b) comprehensiveness-the health care insurance plan must
insure all insured health services provided by hospitals, med-
ical practitioners, dentists and other health professionals as
recognized in provincial law (Section 9);
(c) universality-the health care insurance plan must entitle
100% of the insured persons to the insured health services pro-
vided for by the plan (Section 10);
(d) portability-the health insurance plan must not impose a
waiting period of more than three months on new residents,
and must cover services to those temporarily absent from the
province (Section 11); and
(e) accessibility-the health care insurance plan must pro-
vide access on uniform terms and conditions in accordance with
3 See Robin Boadway, "Federal-Provincial Transfers in Canada; A Critical
Review of the Existing Arrangements" in Krasnick (ed.) Fiscal Federalism, supra,
note 2 at 40-41.
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a tariff authorized in provincial law to all insured health
services provided by doctors, dentists, and hospitals
(Section 12).
Comprehensiveness, portability and accessibility are not as strong condi-
tions as might first appear, as no strong requirements are placed under
CHA on what health services must be insured. Nonetheless, these are
important criteria for provincial health insurance plans.
VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION OF DISABLED PERSONS ACT
(VRDP)
In many ways, VRDP is similar to CAP. There is a very general statute
providing for 50/50 cost-sharing, a standard form agreement with the
provinces (except for Quebec which does not participate at present), and
"Guidelines Relating to Cost-Sharing under the Vocational
Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons Act" (October, 1986). The agreement
with each province has seven schedules. There are detailed understand-
ings about VRDP comprehended fully only by federal and provincial
officials with access to internal government documentation. The CAP
Directorate of Health and Welfare Canada also administers VRDP.
VRDP is a much smaller program than CAP -about one fiftieth its size
in terms of the total federal contribution. Nonetheless, VRDP is very
important to disabled people requiring rehabilitation services. As with
CAP, federal conditions place significant limitations on what the pro-
vincial governments can do in this area (if they want to do it with "50%
dollars"). For example, the definition of "disabled person" in Section 2
of VRDP is "a person who because of physical or mental impairment is
incapable of pursuing regularly any substantially gainful occupation".
This generally excludes disabled people who are already working, who
may be in need of adaptations or supports to keep their jobs. It makes
sense to provide the assistance required rather than to have persons
become unemployed (at which point they become eligible for VRDP cost-
sharing!) but a province providing this help does so with 100% provin-
cial funds. '
VRDP was first enacted in 1960. Like CAP, it has not had a substantial
revision for some time, and should now be reconsidered. Another major
set of issues raised by VRDP are those related to sheltered workshops.
Workshops were perceived as important innovations in 1960, but their
34 When the federal government negotiated the 1976-78 renewal of the VRDP
agreement with the provinces, it was amended to include coverage of "follow-up
goods and services" to disabled persons who become employed, but there is a
time-limit of 18 month after employment is obtained.
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effectiveness in integrating and training disabled people has been called
into serious question in recent years.35 It is now time to reconsider the
preferred status which workshops seems to have as models of vocational
rehabilitation services within the VRDP framework.
IV. THE FEDERAL -PROVINCIAL REVIEW OF
FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING PERSONS
WITH DISABILITIES
The Review had its beginnings in federal-provincial negotiations about
the renewal of VRDP agreements with the provinces in 1985.36 The fed-
eral and provincial Ministers at that time asked their Deputies to begin
work on a review of VRDP and some related aspects of CAP. Work
progressed rather slowly on the design of the Review, and a public
announcement by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, the
Honourable Jake Epp, and his provincial and territorial counterparts
was finally made on January 23, 1987.
The disabled community welcomed the Review but expressed concern
about the limitations in scope which were incorporated. The Review is
focussed on rehabilitation and support programs; excluded are residen-
tial programs, income maintenance, and programs for children and eld-
erly persons. Thus most of CAP is left out, including issues which of
course are critical for people with disabilities. The justification
advanced for this is apparently that restricting the scope would offer
more opportunity for progress to be made.37 But this is unconvincing,
because of the close relationship between rehabilitation and support, on
the one hand, and the areas excluded, on the other. It is not possible to
make rehabilitation more effective without eliminating the disincen-
tives to work inherent in the income maintenance system, through chang-
ing the CAP earnings and asset guidelines. It is not possible to separate
the issue of where someone works from the question of where that person
lives. What is needed, after two decades, is a complete assessment of
CAP and VRDP in the context of a willingness to reform each as required.
This has not been undertaken by Mr. Epp and his provincial counterparts.
3s See, for example, Judge Rosalie Silberman Abella, Report of the Commission
on Equality in Employment ( Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada,
1984) at 42-43.
36 The following overview of the Review is based on: Michael Mendelson,
"Governments review 'gifts with strings attached', in Ability and Enterprise
(Newsletter of the Canadian Council on Rehabilitation and Work, January/
February 1987, Vol. 1, No. 4), p. 1 and p. 7. Mendelson originally co-chaired the
Review.
37 Mendelson, supra, note 36 at 7.
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Even within the limited framework advanced, consultation has been
uneven. The original agreement as expressed in the January 23rd
announcement was that provincial and territorial ministers would con-
sult with organizations in their jurisdiction while Health and Welfare
Canada would consult with national organizations. As of the date of
writing (August, 1987) only some provinces had undertaken an adequate
consultation process and the federal government had not begun to consult,
at least in any formal sense. This would seem to reflect a low priority
attached to the exercise, especially in light of the target date of
December, 1987 for the final report.
Disabled Canadians have been disappointed many times before by fed-
eral-provincial negotiations and consultations. An important recent
example is provided by the "Joint Federal-Provincial Study of a
Comprehensive Disability Protection Program" (September, 1983).3" This
study, so important to disabled persons, was completed by a Task Force of
federal and provincial officials without public involvement or consulta-
tion, and has not held to any further discussion or initiatives with
respect to a comprehensive national program. In fact, the Task Force
report itself, which does contain considerable valuable information, has
had only a very limited circulation.
Disability organizations have attempted to influence governments at
both levels to make the Review responsive and effective.39 Only time
will tell if they have been successful and to what extent.
Organizations representing disadvantaged groups other than disabled
persons have not been offered a consultation with respect to CAP at all.
A thorough examination with public input on CAP is essential, however,
if social assistance and human service issues are to be addressed
properly.
V. REFORM THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE AND
CHARTER LITIGATION
Another route which may be available to disadvantaged persons and
their advocates seeking to reform federal-provincial fiscal arrangements
38 The five volumes of this study were only made available to consumer groups
on request as of a meeting of the Minister of National Health and Welfare and
his provincial counterparts in January, 1987. It is apparently still under study by
government. See: Obstacles Update (Department of the Secretary of State or
Canada, 1987), Recommendation 39, p. 31.
39 For example, the Coalition of Provincial Organizations of the Handicapped
(COPOH), a national disability consumer group, has prepared a pamphlet enti-
tled "Raising a Voice of Our Own .... On Social Assistance / VRDP."
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as they impact on social policy is litigation. The first and primary
obstacle to this approach is the theory, recognized up to now by the
courts, that the federal legislation creating these fiscal arrangements
does not determine rights to social benefits, but simply creates the
authority to cost-share without impinging on provincial constitutional
jurisdiction. The Saskatchewan case Re Lofstrom and Murphy4 illus-
trates this theory. In this case it was held that CAP does not provide
any right to assistance which an individual can claim directly-it is
only provincial assistance legislation which creates such rights.
In the next section of this paper we shall consider the validity of this
theory, and how it might be impacted on by current proposals for consti-
tutional reform, in more detail. For purposes of the current section we
shall assume the basic validity of the sharp distinction between cost-
sharing and legislating, as envisaged by the theory, and consider litiga-
tion approaches which do not challenge this directly.
In the important decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Finlay41
case, one strategy has received judicial recognition. Mr. Finlay is a
social assistance recipient in Manitoba. For forty-six months a 5% deduc-
tion was made from his allowance by way of recovery of an overpayment.
He contended that this deduction was in breach of the CAP legislation
as well as the cost-sharing agreement between the federal government
and Manitoba, in that the deduction effectively lowered his allowance
below his basic requirements (see the discussion of CAP conditions in
Section II of this paper). He sued for a declaration that the federal cost-
sharing payments to Manitoba were therefore illegal and for an injunc-
tion to stop them. This action was brought solely against Ministries of
the federal government: the province of Manitoba was not named as a
defendant and no relief was sought directly against it (in fact, the prov-
ince was not even an intervenor and was unrepresented by counsel).
The federal government applied to strike out the statement of claim on
the grounds that Finlay had no standing to sue and that no cause of action
was disclosed. The Trial Division of the Federal Court of Canada
granted this application, but Finlay appealed to the Federal Court of
Appeal and his appeal was allowed. A further appeal by the govern-
ment to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed, with the result
that Finlay has standing to pursue the case on its merits (at the time or
writing, the case on the merits is continuing).
While the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the matter as a standing
issue, and did not in any way decide whether Finlay is entitled to
40 (1972), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 120.
41 Finlay v. Minister of Finance Of Canada, Minister of National Health and
Welfare and Attorney General of Canada, 48 N.R. 126 (Fed. C. A.); 71 N.R. 338
(S.C.C.)
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declaratory or injunctive relief, the decision is significant nonetheless.
Mr. Justice Le Dain, writing the opinion of the Court, emphasized the
close connection between the issue of standing and the issue of whether
there is a reasonable cause of action, and stated in effect that there is no
clear reason for saying that Finlay could not succeed.42
Finlay raises the possibility that disadvantaged persons and their
advocates could seek to reform federal-provincial fiscal arrangements
and their implementation through obtaining administrative law reme-
dies. The other potential route to reform through litigation would be to
attack provisions of fiscal arrangements legislation and supporting docu-
ments using the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
An analysis of the potential for using the Charter to reform income main-
tenance and social service programs is beyond the scope of this paper."
Such an analysis would involve consideration of fundamental issues such
as the relationship between definition of eligibility by categories and
equality rights, the extent to which economic rights are protected under
sections 7 and 15, and when the exercise of discretionary decision-making
powers by public officials is reviewable in the light of Charter provi-
sions. Here only a few suggestions will be made as to particular issues
which might arise in challenging federal-provincial fiscal
arrangements.
Where a provision in a provincial statute, regulation, or guideline is dis-
criminatory or otherwise violates the Charter, those applicants or
recipients adversely affected may apply pursuant to section 24 for relief
against the provincial law. If the Charter violation at the provincial
level can be traced to a corresponding provision in the federal legislation
or supporting documents, it is probable that section 24 would permit a
remedy in respect of the federal law as well. While no precedent exists
so far for this, the broad language of section 24(1) requires only that a
right be "infringed or denied" for an application to be brought, and
allows "such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances". Given the broad purposes of the Charter and the liberal
approach to standing reflected in Finlay, it is reasonable to speculate
that an applicant or recipient would be given standing to challenge a fis-
cal arrangements condition.
A simple example of a provision which might be challenged is provided
by the CAP Liquid Asset Exemption Guideline quoted in Section II. The
Guideline rules set a liquid asset limit of $3000 for a single disabled per-
42 71 N. R. 338 at 371-372.
4 Constitution Act, 1982.
44 A comprehensive study entitled "The Impact of the Charter of Rights on
Social Assistance" was prepared by Sandra Wain for Ontario's Social Assistance
Review.
(1988), 3 Journal of Law and Social Policy
son and $5500 for a couple both of whom are disabled. Arguably this is
marital status discrimination in that two single people would together
have a $6000 limit, $500 more than that for a couple. A couple in a prov-
ince who were denied assistance (on the basis of provincial rules mirror-
ing this Guideline) could apply under the Charter for relief against both
the provincial legislation and CAP. (Of course there would be arguments
advanced to indicate that this does not offend equality rights, such as
that the needs of couples are different than those of individuals, that
marital status requires a lower "level of scrutiny" as a non-enumerated
class under section 15(1), and so on). If the couple's application were suc-
cessful, an amendment of the Guideline would presumably be among the
remedies which the court could order.
An even more speculative area for Charter litigation would be inter-
provincial comparisons between benefits and programs. Social assistance
and services funded under CAP, EPF and VRDP differ substantially from
province to province. The question arises as to whether such inequalities
might form the basis for a Charter challenge by an applicant or recipient
in a province which provides less.
The Ontario Court of Appeal has decided that section 15 can prohibit
discrimination on the basis of place, and in particular, on the basis of
which province a person resides in.4 s The case in which it did so, how-
ever, was a criminal matter in which the issue was that the federal gov-
ernment has provided in drinking and driving offences that conditional
discharges could be provided where the accused underwent a treatment
program, but that this alternative to a mandatory fine or imprisonment
would only be available in those provinces consenting to it. Thus the
accused did not have the conditional discharge alternative available to
them in Ontario, but would have had this alternative available in sev-
eral other provinces and territories. The Ontario Court of Appeal held
that this was a violation of the equality rights of the accused, and gave
the accused the right to consideration for conditional discharges upon
undertaking to receive treatment. The Supreme Court of Canada refused
leave to appeal, so this decision stands as authority for the proposition
that there cannot be different rights under criminal law in different
provinces.
The situation with respect to inter-provincial differences in social
allowances and benefits may seem similar to the criminal law situation
just outlined. The important difference, however, is of course that crimi-
nal law is clearly within federal jurisdiction, whereas social programs
are provincial. The Ontario Court of Appeal in its decision made it
plain that section 15 did not require provinces to pass the same laws
within their own jurisdiction." The open question is whether a basis
I R. v. Hamilton, R. v. Asselin, R. v. MuCullagh, 57 O.R. (2d) 412.
46 57 O.R. (2d) 412 at 431.
Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements
could be found in federal-provincial fiscal legislation such as CAP, EPF,
CHA and VRDP to counter the argument that the social policy field is
wholly provincial.
Once again we are back to the theory, up to now recognized by the courts,
that federal statutes of this type just create a mechanism for spending or
cost-sharing and do not legislate substantive entitlements or limitations.
That this is something of a fiction is clear from the account already
given of how the federal government puts in half the money and partici-
pates with the provinces in on-going development of these programs. It
might well be possible to get a court to consider reviewing inter-
provincial differences under section 15 of the Charter where this degree
of federal involvement exists.
To take a simple example, suppose social assistance recipient X lives in
province A and recipient Y lives in province B, that their circumstances
are identical, and that X receives $100 more monthly than Y in assis-
tance provided under CAP. Then the reality of the situation is that X is
getting $50 more in federal money than Y despite having the same needs,
assets and income. Put in these terms, the situation does not seem so much
different from that considered by the Ontario Court of Appeal. (As with
the previous example, this is put forth by way of illustration only and is
not intended to minimize counter-arguments that could be brought, eg.
that it costs more to live in one province that another, that it would be
within province B's jurisdiction to provide alternate benefits in kind such
as a dental plan, clothing or reduced transportation rather than the
additional $100, and so on).
The impact of administrative and Charter litigation on federal-
provincial fiscal arrangements in the social policy field is difficult to
predict. The issues raised by such litigation are complex and novel. It
will take time to develop a body of case law in this area detailed
enough to have major impact. So, while litigation has an important role
to play in social policy reform in Canada, it will have to proceed in tan-
dem with community advocacy and political action if fundamental
reform is to be achieved.
VI. THE IMPACT OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
In the introductory section of this paper, it was pointed out that federal-
provincial fiscal arrangements in the social policy field have arisen in
the context of the division of powers between the federal and provincial
levels of government set out in the British North America Act. Social
assistance, welfare services, health and education were placed in pro-
vincial jurisdiction47 while the primary taxation powers were federal. 48
47 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92, para. 7, 8, 13, 16.
48 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91, para. 3.
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Starting in the 1930's, the necessity for the federal government to become
involved in the social policy field became clearer and clearer, and the
result was a variety of cost-sharing mechanisms and block grants, culmi-
nating in present-day fiscal arrangements such as CAP, EPF, CHA and
VRDP.
The constitutional doctrine justifying these arrangements has become
known as the federal spending power doctrine49-the principle that the
federal government can make payments to individuals, organizations or
other levels of government for purposes not within its own constitutional
jurisdiction, and that it can make these payments subject to conditions if
it wishes s0 As we have seen, an impressive array of federal-provincial
programs has been created based on the theory of the spending power.
Yet the constitutional status of the spending power has never been defin-
itively established and remains controversial.51
Only a very limited number of cases have touched on the spending power.
In the Employment and Social Insurance Act Reference 2 case in 1937 the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council upheld a Supreme Court of
Canada decision ruling that an unemployment insurance scheme was
ultra vires the federal government. While in this case the basic concept
of the federal spending power was upheld, it was also established that
the spending power could not be used to enact legislation infringing upon
civil rights in the provinces or any other matter within provincial juris-
diction. By providing in detail for an unemployment insurance scheme,
the proposed federal legislation went over this line. (In 1940 a constitu-
tional amendment was enacted whichpermittcd the federal government
to introduce unemployment insurance.)
Later decisions tended to mitigate this approach by the courts and to
permit some use of the federal spending power. In 1957, the Exchequer
Court upheld the validity of the federal Family Allowance program in
the Angers case. 4 Twenty years later, the Ontario Court of Appeal
upheld the authority of the federal government to make National
Housing Act loans for university student residences. But the issue of the
49 For a clear explanation of the spending power doctrine see: Banting, The
Welfare State and Canadian Federalism, supra, note 2 at pp. 52-54.
so For more on the attaching of conditions see Forget, 'The Harmonization of
Social Policy", in Krasnick (ed.) Fiscal Federalism, supra, note 2 at pp. 109-112.
sI Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism, supra, note 2 at p. 52.
52 Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney General of Ontario, [19371
A.C 355 (P.C.).
0 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91, para 2A.
s4 Angers v. M.N.R. [1957] Ex. C. R. 83.
0 Winterhaven Stables Limited v. Attorney General of Canada 71 A. R. 1.
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federal spending power has never been dealt with directly by the
Supreme Court of Canada since the unemployment insurance Reference in
the 1930's and there has been no clear judicial theory developed as to
what conditions the federal government can impose on funding to areas of
provincial competence. The uncertainty which remains is underscored by
the 1986 Winterhaven Stables Ltd. case in which the plaintiff is suing
for a declaration that federal-provincial fiscal arrangements including
CAP, EPF and CHA are ultra vires the federal government as trenching
on provincial jurisdiction (the plaintiff seeks to challenge federal taxa-
tion to pay for these programs). While the power of the federal govern-
ment to enter into these arrangements pursuant to its spending power was
upheld in the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench, the case is under appeal
and, as it proceeds, will require the higher courts to elaborate on the
spending power theory in more detail than has been required in many
years.
Political as well as legal controversy has surrounded the federal spend-
ing power, and its use in developing programs in the social policy field.
There are strong advocates of federal involvement. They would like to
see the spending power established in the Canadian Constitution to
allow the federal government to take a leadership role in developing
social policy initiatives, to deal with regional disparities, and to set
national standards which will limit the powers of the provinces (in
practice, although not constitutionally) to establish programs different
from the national models s6 On the other hand, there are those who are
strongly opposed to the federal government using its spending power to
attach conditions in the social policy, health and education fields to the
monies it shares with provinces. This group includes those who empha-
size the importance of provincial initiatives in developing new social
policies.' those opposed to present federal policies58, and those who
accept as a fundamental principle of Canadian federalism that the
provinces should be able to set their own policies in these areas.5 9 Of
particular importance in this last group is the government of Quebec,
which has historically opposed federal involvement in this area and
-1 This has been the most commonly held view among social policy advocates
in Canada since the Depression. The majority of national organizations of and
for disadvantaged persons tend to lean towards this approach.
s Especially the birth of medicare in Saskatchewan in the 1940's.
" Such as physicians opposed to the CHA provisions which have effectively
meant the end of extra-billing.
s5 The stronger and richer provinces such as Ontario, Alberta and British
Columbia especially tend to take this position (as well as Quebec, as noted
below).
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which has consistently defended its own sovereignty in the social policy
field.60
The 1987 Constitutional Accord (the "Meech Lake/Langevin Block
agreement") contains a provision intended to resolve these conflicting
legal and political considerations. Section 106a of the Accord reads:
(1) The Government of Canada shall provide reasonable com-
pensation to the government of a province that chooses not to
participate in a national shared-cost program that is esta-
blished by the government of Canada after the coming into
force of this section in an area of exclusive provincial jurisdic-
tion, if the province carries on a program or initiative that is
compatible with the national objectives
(2) Nothing in this section extends the legislative powers of
the Parliament of Canada or of the legislatures of the
provinces.61
The intent of Section 106a is apparently to provide a constitutional basis
for the spending power, but to balance this with a "compensation princi-
ple" which will allow the provinces to "opt out" of a program. The dif-
ficulty with this proposed compromise between the federal and
provincial roles is, however, that the language is not precise enough to
allow a clear interpretation of what the "solution" is.
A short list of the interpretation problems raised by this provision will
serve to illustrate the difficulties it creates:
(a) what is "reasonable compensation" - does it mean an
equivalent amount to what participating provinces would get
(and if it does, how is "equivalent" determined?) or would it
allow a "deduction" where the non-participating province
falls short of the national model?
(b) what is a "shared-cost program" - does it refer only to
programs like CAP and VRDP which proceed on a matching
costs basis (this is the way some commentators use the term
"shared-cost")62 or does it include EPF/CHA and other block-
funding?
60 Quebec's objections to federal proposals to entrench the spending power
played a key role in that Province's decision to reject the Victoria Charter (a con-
stitutional proposal in the early 1970's).
61 Constitution Amendment, 1987, s. 7.
62 For example, Maslove and Rubaskewsky in "Cooperation and Confrontation:
The Challenges of Fiscal Federalism", supra, note 2, clearly characterize CAP
but not EPF as "shared-cost". It appears to have a technical meaning which may
not carry over into its use in the Accord.
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(c) what does "established .... after the coming into force of
this section" mean - this presumably is intended to exempt
existing programs from the operation of Section 106a but it is
not clear (given the comprehensiveness of CAP and EPF) when
amendments might constitute new programs caught by this
section.
(d) does "program or initiative" mean more than just
"program" and, if so, what?
(e) what are "national objectives" - in the context of the
Accord, a distinction is made between "objectives" and"standards",'3 so "objectives" must have some generality, but
it is still unclear what an "objective" may include;
(f) what does "compatible" mean - is this a weaker term
than "conforming", for example?
(g) what are the procedures whereby this section is imple-
mented - for example, if a "new" program is proposed, when
do provinces have to elect whether or not to participate?"
These problems are not hypothetical but relate directly to current issues
of great concern. The validity of the CHA condition that provinces not
permit extra-billing if they are to receive full EPF cost-sharing, the
question of whether the CAP restriction on direct funding of for-profit
services will be carried into a new day care initiative, the possibility of
provinces moving from needs-testing to other social assistance models-
all of these will be determined in large part by how section 106a is inter-
preted (if the Accord becomes a constitutional amendment).
These issues and others would be determined, not just by the specific
working of section 106a, but also by what the courts take to be the legis-
lative intent of the provision in the context of the Accord as a whole.
Despite subsection (2), most commentators have viewed the intent as a
limiting of the federal role in social policy and related fields previously
achieved through the spending power.' The section appears to address
Quebec's concerns for provincial autonomy, together with the concerns of
other provinces particularly about the use of the spending power in the
3 Proposed new section 95 b(2) uses the phrase "national standards and objec-
tives" in the context of immigration, while as we have seen section 106a just
refers to "objectives".
" Perhaps a more difficult question is what constitutes a "new" program or ini-
tiative - for example, if reforms of CAP were extensive enough, could this sec-
tion come into play?
' The whole of the Meech Lake/Langevin Block Accord is viewed by some
(Pierre Elliot Trudeau being the most famous) as a surrender of power (and
responsibility?) to the provinces by the federal government.
(1988), 3 Journal of Law and Social Policy
extra-billing dispute, and to restrict the effective use of the spending
power by giving an explicit right to "opt out" to the provinces.
Advocates of a stronger federal role in social policy will no doubt propose
amendments to Section 106a to resolve some of the difficulties identified
above-such as replacing "objectives" by "objectives and standards"" or
even by removing the compensation principle altogether. The prospects
for such amendments have to be viewed in the context in which the
Meech Lake/Langevin Block agreement was formulated, however. The
Accord is unanimously supported at the time of writing by the federal
government and all ten provincial governments, as well as the two oppo-
sition parties federally. ' It is seen by them as a way to rectify the situ-
ation with respect to the 1982 constitutional "deal" in which a
constitution was imposed on Quebec over the objections of its overnment,
containing provisions which Quebec clearly could not accept. A funda-
mental amendment in an area of such importance as social policy will be
difficult to achieve over Quebec's objections (although of course the
whole future of the Accord in the political arena is far from settled).
Whether disadvantaged groups and their advocates can reach consensus
on amending section 106a or not, and whether they can have an impact or
not, a major concern remains about the uncertainties of interpretation
created by this kind of wording. We have seen in this paper how obsta-
cles have prevented reform of federal-provincial fiscal arrangements-
in particular the obstacles created by the esoteric nature of the arrange-
ments and the "internal" way they are developed between governments
without the ordinary flow of information and public accountability that
usually attaches to important laws. Section 106a surely makes this prob-
lem more difficult to address. It creates new parameters for cost-sharing
and related fiscal models which may be defined by the courts-although
6 Of course, this would not resolve all uncertainty - the term "standards" too
would admit of varying interpretations, but it clearly would seem to permit more
specificity than does "objectives".
67 However, the federal Liberal party is drafting amendments, as is the federal
New Democratic Party, and strong representations have been made to the rul-
ing Liberals in Ontario and New Democrats in Manitoba in particular to recon-
sider various provisions. While no party has said formally that it will reject the
Accord unless it is amended, there is certainly movement towards a more critical
stance at least.
6 This is expanded on in: J.E. Magnet, "The Charter's Official Languages
Provisions: The Implications of Entrenched Bilingualism", in The New
Constitution and the Charter of Rights, Edward P. Belobaba and Eric Gernter.
eds., (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), pp. 163-193. See especially the opening sec-
tions of Magnet's paper.
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judges are not the most appropriate persons to make these decisions69-- or
which may simply be left more or less undefined and unclear. The lack of
accountability and responsibility which would result in itself would
serve as a deterrent to reform at both the federal and provincial levels.
It is incumbent on groups representing and advocating for disadvantaged
Canadians to require more clarity from both levels of government as to
what this constitutional "deal" means in the social policy field. At the
very least, more particulars as to the interpretation questions outlined
above should be demanded during the consultation process regarding the
Accord.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because of the current initiatives and events discussed above, there is
more opportunity and need than ever before for organizations of disad-
vantaged persons and their advocates to become informed about federal-
provincial fiscal arrangements in the social policy field, to carry out an
analysis of them, and to communicate their views clearly and forcefully.
If this paper has served in some small way as a stimulus to this activity,
the author will view it as a success.70 Now more than ever, it is essen-
tial to counteract any subordination of the needs of disadvantaged per-
sons to the political realities of Canadian federalism71 and to work
toward reforms which will bring all excluded individuals and groups
into the mainstream of Canadian life where a full range of opportunities
and expectations is available.
69 Aside from philosophical considerations about the appropriate role of non-
elected judges in a democracy, there are simply the practical considerations that
judges (save in exceptional cases) do not have the expertise or resources to do
effective social policy analysis. Yet this is what section 106a would require them
to do on a very large and complex scale.
70 The author would welcome questions and comments from readers, as well as
suggestions regarding further work to be done in this area.
4 See the Introduction to Ismael (ed.), Canadian Social Welfare Policy, supra,
note 2 at XV.
